T H E J O U R N
ens. hi^ article reports on a of experimental games desigrled to stuciy some of the hypotheses of neoclassical competitive market theory. since the organized stock, bond, and commodity exchanges would seem to have the best chance of fulfilling the conditions of an operational theory of supply and demand, most of these experiments have
The experiments on nhich this leport is based have been performed over a six-year period beginning in 1955. They are part of a continuing study, in which the next phase is to include experimentation with monetary payoffs and more complicated experimental designs to mhich passing references are made here and there in the present repo~t. I wish to thank Mrs. lIaril>n Schweizer for assistance in typing and in the preparation of charts in this paper, been designed to simulate, on a motlest scale, the multilateral auction-trading process characteristic of these organized markets. I would emphasize, however, that they are intended as simulations of certain key features of the organized markets and of competitive marketsgenerally, rather than as direct, exhaustive simulations of any particular organized exchange. The experimental conditions of and demand in force these markets are the and demand curves gellerated by the limit price orders in the hands of stock and commodity market brokers a t the opening of a trading day in any Onestock or commodity, tllough I would consider then1 to be good general models of received short-run supply and demand theory. A similar experimental supply and demand model was first used by
E. H. ChaInberlin iIl an illteresting set
Of that pre-date conternporary interest in experimelltal games." Chamberlin's paper was highly suggestive in demonstrating the potentialities of experimental techniques in the study of applied market theory.
Parts I1 and I11 of this paper are devoted to a descriptive discussion of the experiments and some of their detailed results. Parts IV and V present an empirical analysis of various equilibrating hypotheses and a rationalization of the hypothesis found to be most successful in these experiments.
Part VI provides a brief summary which the reader may wish to consult before reading the main body of the paper.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
The experiments discussed in Parts I11 and I V have followed the same general design pattern. The group of subjects is divided a t random into two subgroups, a group of buyers and a group of sellers. Each buyer receives a card containing a number, known only to that buyer, which represents the maximum price he is willing to pay for one unit of the fictitious commodity. It is explained that the buyers are not to buy a unit of the commodity a t a price exceeding that appearing on their buyer's card; they would be quite happy to purchase a unit a t any price below this number-the lower the better; but, they would be entirely willing to pay just this price for the commodity rather than have their wants go unsatisfied. I t is further explained that each buyer should think of himself as making a pure pro6 t equal to the difference between his actual contract price and the maximum reservation price on his card. These reservation prices generate a demand curve such as DL) in the diagram on the left in Chart 1. At each price the corresponding quantity represents the maximum amount that could be purchased a t that price. Thus, in Chart 1, the highest price buyer is willing to pay as much as $3.25 for one unit. At a price above $3.25 the demand quantity is zero, and a t $3.25 it cannot exceed one unit. The next highest price buyer is willing to pay $3.00. Thus, a t $3.00 the demand quantity cannot exceed two units. The phrase "cannot exceed" rather than "is" will be seen to be of no small importance. How much is actually taken a t any price depends upon such important things as how the market is organized, and various mechanical and bargaining considerations associated with the offeracceptance process. The demand curve, therefore, defines the set (all points on or to the left of DD) of possible demand quantities a t each, strictly hypothetical, ruling price.
Each seller receives a card containing a number, known only to that seller, which represents the minimum price a t which he is willing to relinquish one unit of the commodity. I t is explained that the sellers should be willing to sell a t their minimum supply price rather than fail to make a sale, but they make a pure profit determined by the excess of their contract price over their minimum reservation price. Under no condition should they sell below this minimum. These minimum seller prices generate a supply curve such as SS in Chart 1. At each hypothetical price the corresponding quantity represents the maximum amount that could be sold a t that price. The supply curve, therefore, defines the set of possible supply quantities a t each hypothetical ruling price.
I n experiments 1-8 each buyer and seller is allowed to make a contract for the exchange of only a single unit of the commodity during any one trading or market period. This rule was for the sake of simplicity and was relaxed in EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF COMPETITIVE MARKET BEHAVIOR 113 subsequent experiments.
Each experiment was conducted over a sequence of trading periods five to ten minutes long depending upon the number of participants in the test group. Since the experiments were conducted within a class period, the number of trading periods was not uniform among has been closed, and the buyer and seller making the deal drop out of the market in the sense of no longer being permitted to make bids, offers, or contracts for the remainder of that market p e r i~d .~ As soon as a bid or offer is accepted, the contract price is recorded together with the minimum supply price of the seller
the various experiments. In the typical experiment, the market opens for trading period 1. This means that any buyer (or seller) is free a t any time to raise his hand and make a verbal offer to buy (or sell) a t any price which does not violate his maximum (or minimum) reservation price. Thus, in Chart 1, the buyer holding the $2.50 card might raise his hand and shout, "Buy a t $1.00." The seller with the $1.50 card might then shout, "Sell a t $3.60." Any seller (or buyer) is free to accept a bid (or offer), in which case a binding contract and the maximum demand mice of the buyer involved in the transaition. These observations represent the recorded data of the e~periment.~ Within the time limit All purchases are for final consumption. There are no speculative purchases for resale in the same or later periods. There is nothing, however, to prevent one from designing an experiment in which purchases for resale are permitted if the objective is to study the role of speculation in the equilibrating process. One could, for example, permit the carryover of s t d s from one period to the next.
Owing to limitations of manpower and equipment in experiments 1-8, bids and offers which did not lead to transactions could not be recorded. In subsequent experiments a tape recorder was used for this purpose.
\-ERNOX I.. SlITTII of a trading period, this procedure is continued until bids and oft'ers are no longer leading to contracts. One or two calls are made for final bids or offers and the market is officially closed. This ends period 1 . The market is then immediately reopened for the second "day" of trading. All buyers, including those who did and those who did not make coiltracts in the preceding trading period, i~o x~(as explained previously to the subjects) have a renewed urge to buy one unit of the commodity. For each buyer, the same maximum buying price holds in the second period as prevailed in the first period. In this way the experimental demand curve represents a demand per unit time or per trading period. Similarly, each seller, we may imagine, has "overnight" acquired a fresh unit of the commodity which he desires to sell in period 2 under the same minimum price conditions as prevailed in period 1. The experimental supply curve thereby represents a willingness to supply per unit time. Trading period 2 is allowed to run its course, arlcl then period 3, and so on. By this means we construct a prototype market in which there is a flow of a commodity onto and off the market. The stage is thereby set to study price behavior under given conditions of normal supply and demand.5 Some buyers and sellers, it should be noted, may be unable to make contracts in any trading period, or perhaps only in certain periods. Tnsofar as these traders are submarginal buyers or sellers, this is to be eupected. Indeed, the ability of these experimental markets to ration out submarginal buyers and sellers will be one measure of the effectiveness or competitive performance of the market.
The above design considerations define a rejection set of offers (and bids) for each I~uyer (and seller), which in turn defines a demand and a supply schedule for the marliet in question.-These schedules do nothing beyond setting extreme limits to the observable price-quantity behavior in that marliet. All we can say is that the area above the supply curve is a region in which sales are feasible, while tvhe area below the demand curve is a region in which purchases are feasible. ~~m~e t i t i v e price theory asserts that there will be a tendency for price-quantity equilibrium to occur a t the extreme quantity point of the intersection of these G o areas. For example, in Chart 1 the shaded triangular area APB represents the intersection of these feasible sales and purchase sets, with P the extreme point of this set. We have no guarantee that the equilibrium defined by the intersection of these sets will prevail, even approximately, in the experimental market (or any real counterpart of it). The mere fact that, by any definition, supply and demand schedules exist in the background of a market does not guarantee that any meaningful relationship exists
The design of my experiments differs from that of Chamberlin (op. cit.) in several ways. I n Chamberlm's experinlent the buyers and sellers simply circulate and engage in bilateral higgling and bargaining until they make a contract or the trading perioti ends. As contracts are made the transaction price is recorded on the blackboard. Consecluently, there is very little, if any, multilateral bidding. Each trader's attention is directed to the one person with whom he is bargaining, nhereas in my experiments each trader's quotation is addressed to the entire trading group one quotation a t a time. Also Chamberlin's experiment constitutes a pure exchange market operated for a single trading period. There is, therefore, less opportunity for traders to gain experience and to modify their subsequent behavior in the light of such experience. I t is only through some learning mechanism of this kind that I can imagine the possibility of equilibrium being approached in any real market. Finally, in the present experiments I have varied the design from one experiment to another in a conscious attempt to study the effect of different conditions of supply and demand, changes in supply or demand, and changes in the rules of market organization on market-price behavior.
between those schedules and what is observed in the market they are presumed to represent. =\11 the supply and demand schedules can do is set broad limits on the behavior of the market.6 Thus, in the symmetrical supply and demand diagram of Chart 3 , it is conceivable that every buyer ant1 seller could make a contract. The $3.25 buyer could buy from the $3.25 seller, the $3.00 buyer could buy from the $3.00 seller, and so forth, wiihout violating any restrictions on the behavior of buyers and sellers. Tntleed, if we separately paired buyers and sellers in this special way, each pair could be expectetl to make a bilateral contract a t the seller's miilimum price which ~voulti be equal to the buyer's maximum price.
I t should be noted that these e s~e r iments conform in several important ways to what we know must be true of many kinds of real markets. I n a real competitive market such as a commodity or stock exchange, each marketer is likely to be ignorant of the reservation prices a t which other buyers and sellers are willing to trade. Furthermore, the only m y that a real marketer can obtain 1;tiowletlge of market conditions is to V n fact, these schetlu!es are motiiiled as trading takes place. \Vhenevci-a ljuyer and a seller make a contract and "drol) out" of the market, the demancl and supl)ly schetlules are shifted to the left in a nianner tlepentli~lg upon tlie buyer's atid seller's position on the schetlules. Iience, the supply and tiemand ru~ictions co~itinually alter as the trading process occul-s. It is ~IiLhc~~it to imagine a real market xoccss which does not exhibit this characteristic. 
I
. his means that the intra-trading-~~eriotl schedules are not iridepentlent of the transac~ions taking place. FIo\?-ever, the iiziiial schedules prevailirig a t the openilig of each trading period are independent of the transactions, and it is these schedules that I identify with the "theoretical conditions of supply and tlcmand," which the theorist delines independently of actual niarket prices and quantities. One ol the importallt ol~jrctives in these experiments is to determine whether or not these irlitial schetlules have any power to ~)retlict the observetl behavior ol the market.
observe the offers and bids that are tendered, and whether or not they are accepted. These are the public data of the market. A marketer can only know his own attitude, and, from observation, learn something about the objective behavior of others. This is a major feature of these experimental markets. We deliberately avoid placing a t the disposal of our subjects any information which would not be practically attainable in a real market. Each experimental market is forced to provide all of its own "history." These markets are also a replica of real markets in that they are composed of a practical number of marketers, say twenty, thirty, or forty. We do not require an indefinitely large number of marketers, ~v l~i c h is usually supposed necessary for the existence of "pure" competition.
One important condition operating in our experimental markets is not likely to prevail in real markets. The experimental conditions of supply and demand are held constant over several successive trading periods in order to give any equilibrating mechanisms an opportunity to establish an equilibrium over time. Real markets are likely to be continually subjected to changing conditions of supply and demand. hlarshall was well aware of such problems and defined equilibrium as a condition toward which the market would move if the forces of supply and demand were to remain stationary for a sufficiently long time. I t is this concept of equilibrium that this particular series of experiments is designed, in part, to test. There is nothing to prevent one from passing out new buyer and/or seller cards, representing changed demand and/or supply conditions, a t the end of each trading period if the objective is to study the effect of such constantly changing conditions on market behavior. I n three of the nine experiments, oncefor-all changes in demand and/or supply were made for purposes of studying the transient dynamics of a market's response to such stimuli.
DESCRIPTION A h D DISCUSSION

OF E X P E R I M E N T A L RESULTS
The supply and demand schedule for each experiment is shown in the diagram on the left of Charts 1-10. The price and quantity a t which these schedules intersect will be referred to as the predicted or theoretical "equilibrium" price and quantity for the corresponding experimental market, though such an equilibrium will not necessarily be attained or approached in the market. The performance of each experimental market is summarized in the diagram on the right of Charts 1-10, and in Table 1 . Each chart shows the sequence of contract or exchange prices in the order in which they occurred in each trading period. Thus, in Chart 1, the first transaction was effected a t $1.70, the second a t $1.80, and so on, with a total of five transactions occurring in trading period 1. These charts show contract price as a function of transaction number rather than calendar time, the latter of course being quite irrelevant to market dynamics.
The most striking general characteristic of tests 1-3, 5-7, 9, and 10 is the remarkably strong tendency for exchange prices to approach the predicted equilibrium for each of these markets. As the exchange process is repeated through successive trading periods with the same conditions of supply and demand prevailing initially in each period, the variation in exchange prices tends to decline, and to cluster more closely around the equilibrium. In Chart 1, for esample, the variation in contract prices over the five trading periods is from $1.70 to $2.25. The maximum possible variation is from $0.75 to $3.25 as seen in the supply and demand schedules. As a means of measuring the convergence of exchange prices in each market, a "coefficient of convergence," a, has been coi~~puted for each trading period in each market. The a for each trading period is the ratio of the standard deviation of exchange prices, a,,, to the predicted equilibriun~ price, Po, the ratio being expressed as a percentage. That is, a = 100 aolPo where a,, is the standard deviation of exchange prices around the equilibrium price rather than the mean exchange price. Hence, a provides a 111easure of exchange price variation relative to the predicted equilibrium exchange price. ,is is seen in Table 1 and the charts for all tests except test 8, a tends to decline from one trading period to the next, with tests 2, 4A, 5 , 6A, 7, 9A, and 10 showing monotone convergence.
Turning now to the individual experimental results, it will be observed that the equilibrium price and quantity are approxin~ately the same for the supply and demand curves of tests 2 and 3. The significant difference in the design of these two tests is that the supply and demand schedules for test 2 are relatively flat, while the corresponding schedules for test 3 are much more steeply inclined.
Under the Walrasian hypothesis (the rate of increase in exchange price is an increasing function of the excess demand a t that price), one would expect the market in test 2 to converge more rapidly than that in test 3. As is evident from comparing the results in Charts 2 and 3, test 2 shows a more rapid and less erratic tendency toward equilibrium. These results are, of course, cnnristent with many otller hypotheses, including the excess-rent hypothesis, to be discussed later.7
The tests in Chart 4 are of special interest from the point of view of the Walrasian hypothesis. In this case the supply curve is perfectly elastic-all sellers have cards containing the price $3.10. Each seller has the same lower bound on his reservation price acceptance set. equilibrium since there is a considerable excess supply a t prices just barely above the equilibrium price. From the results we see that the market is not particularly slow in converging, but it converges to a fairly stable price about $0.20 above the predicted equilibrium. Furthermore, in test 4B, which was an extension of 4A, the interjection of a decrease in In thi5 senie, 11:erc is no tlivergencc of attitude among the sellers, though there might be marked variation in their bargaining propensities. According to the Walrasian hypothesis this market should exhibit rapid convergence toward the I T h e results are inconsistent n i t h the so-called hfarshallian hypothesis (the rate of increase in quantit) exchanged is an increasing function of the excess of demand price over supply price), but this hypothesis nould seem to be worth considering only in market processes in which some quantity-adjusting decision is made by the marketers. The results of a pilot experiment in "short-run" and "long-run" equilibrium are displayed in the Appendix.
TRANSACTION NUMBER ( B Y PERIOD1
demand from DD to DID' was ineffective as a means of shocking the market down to its supply and demand equilibrium. This decrease in demand was achieved by passing out new buyer cards corresponding to D'D' a t the close of period in test 4A. As the market approaches equilibrium from above, since contracts at prices below equilibrium are The sellers in this market presented 3 solid front against price being lowered to "ecluilibrium." I n the previous mar-kets there was a divergence of seller attitude, so that only a very few marginal and near-marginal sellers might offer serious resistance to price being forced to equilibrium. And this resistance tended to break down when any of the stronger intramarginal sellers accepted contracts below equilibrium.
From these results it is clear that the static competitive market equilibrium may depend not only on the intersection of the supply and demanci schedules, but also upon the shapes of the schedules. Specifically, I was led from test 4 to the tentative hypothesis that there may be an upward bias in the equilibrium price of a market, which will be greater the more elastic is the supply schedule relative to demand.8 For example, let A be the area under the demand schedule and above the theoretical equilibrium. This is Alarshall's consumer surplus, but to avoid any welfare connotations of this term, I shall refer to the area as "buyers' rent." Let B be the area above the supply schedule and below the theoretical equilibrium (Marshall's producer surplus) which I shall call "sellers' rent." Now, the tentative hypothesis was that the actual market ecjuilibrium will be above the theoretical equilibrium by an amount which depends upon how large A is relative to B. Similarly, there will be a downward bias if A is small relative to B.
Test 4 is of course an extreme case, since B = 0. I n test 3, A is larger than B, and the trading periods 3 and 4 exhibit a slight upward bias in the average actual exchange price (see Table 1 ). This provides some slight evidence in favor of the hypothesis.
8 Note that the LValrasian hypothesis might lead one to expect a dol~nward bias since excess supply is very large at prices above equilihriuni if sup1)ly is very elastic relative to demand.
As a consequence of these considerations, test 7 was designed specifically to obtain additional information to support or contradict the indicated hypothesis. I n this case, as is seen in Chart 7 (see below), buyers' rent is substantially smaller than sellers' rent. From the resulting course of contract prices over six trading periods in this experiment, it is evident that the convergence to equilibrium is very slow. From Table  1 , the average exchange prices in the last three trading periods are, respectively, $3.32, $3.33, and $3.34. Average contract prices are still exhibiting a gradual approach to equilibrium. Hence, it is entirely possible that the static equilibrium would eventually have been attained. A still smaller buyers' rent may be required to provide any clear downward bias in the static equilibrium. One thing, however, seems quite unmistakable from Chart 7, the relative magnitude of buyers' and sellers' rent affects the speed with which the actual market equilibrium is approached. One would expect sellers to present a somewhat weaker bargaining front, especially a t first, if their rent potential is large relative to that of buyers. Thus, in Chart 7, it is seen that several low reservation price sellers in trading periocls 1 and 2 made contracts a t low exchange prices, which, no doubt, seemed quite profitable to these sellers. However, in both these trading periods the later exchange prices were much higher, revealing to the lour-price sellers that, however profitable their initial sales had been, still greater proLts were possible under stiffer bargaining.
-4 stronger test of the hypotheses that buyer and seller rents affect the speed of adjustment and that they affect the final equil'1,rillln in the market would t)e ohtainal~lc l)j-introclucing actual monetary payoffs in the experiment. Thus, one might offer to pay each seller the difference between his contract price and his reservation price and each buyer the difference between his reservation price and his contract price. I n addition, one might pay each trader a small lump sum (say $0.05) just for making a contract in any period. This sum would represent G'JeYTITi ii normal pro~its," that is, a small return even if the good is sold a t its minimum supply price or purchased a t its maximum demand price. The present experiments have not seemeti to provide any motivation problems. The subjects have shown high motivation to do their best even without monetary payo-t'is. But our experimental marginal buyers and sellers may be more reluctant to approach their reservation prices than their counterparts in real markets. The use oi nlonetary payoifs, as suggested, should remox c any such reluctance that is attributable to artificial elements in the present cxperii~lents.~
The experinlent summarized in Chart 5 was designed to study the effect on market behavior of changes in the conditions of demand and supply. As it happened, this ex1)eriment was performed on a considerably more mature group
of subjects than any of the other experirnents. Alost of the experiments were performed on sophornore ant1 junior engineering, economics, and business majors, while test 5 was performed on a "Since this was witten, an experiment has been tried using monetary payofis and the same supply and demand design shown in Chart 4. The result, as conjectured in the text, TYas to remove the reluctance of sellers to sell at their reservation prices. Ey the second trading period the market \vas firmly in equilibrium. In the thirtl period all trades were at $3.ti)! A\l)parcntly$0.05 per pcriocl \\.as considerecl satisfactory normal prolit. graduate class in econoinic theory. 111 view of this dil'ference, it is most interesting to find the phenomenally low values for a exhibited by test 5A. The coefficient of convergence is smaller for the opening and later periods of this inarket than for any period of any of the other tests. Furthermore, trading periods 2-4 show a's of less than 1 per cent, indicating an inordinately strong and rapid tendency toward equilibrium. In this case, no offers or bids were accepted until the bidding had converged to prices which were very near indeed to the ecluilibrium. Contract prices ranged from $3.00 to S3.20 as compared with a possible range from $2.10 to $3.75.
. -It the close of test 5A new cards were distributed correspontling to an increase in demand, from DD to DID', as shown in Chart 5.1° The subjects, of course, could guess from the fact that new buyer cards were being distributed that a change in demand was in the wind. But they knew nothing of the direction of change in demand except what might be guessed by the buyers from the alteration of their individual reserv a t' ion prices. When trading began (period 1, test 5B), the immediate response was a very considerable upward sweep in exchange prices with several contracts being closed in the first trading period well above the new higher ecluilibrium price. Indeed, the eagerness to buy was so strong that two sellers who were submarginal both before and after the increase in demand (their reservation prices were ' W o t e also that there was a small (one-unit) decrease in supply from SS to S'S'. This was not planned. It was due to the inal~ility of one sul~ject (the seller with the $2.10 reservation price) in test 5A to participate in test 5B. Therefore, except for the deletion of this one seller from the market, the conditions of supply r e r e not altered, that is, the scllc~.s ol test 5 B retni~~ccl the same rcscrvation 1)ricc cards as they liad ill test 5.1. $3.50 and $3.70) were able to m,~bc contracts in this transient phase of the market. Consecluently, the trading group showing the strongest equilibrating tendencies exhibited very erratic behavior in the transient phase following the increase in demand. Contract prices greatly overshot the new equilibrium and rationing by the market was less efficient in this transient phase. In the second tratling period of test 5B no submarginal sellers or buyers made contracts and tllc inarket exhibited a narrowed movcment toward the new equilibrium.
Test 611 was designed to determine whether market equilibrium was affected by a marlred imbalance between the number of intramarginal sellers and the number of intramarginal buyers near the predicted equilibrium price. The demand curve, DD, in Chart 6 falls continuously to the right in one-unit steps, while the supply curve, SS, becomes perfectly inelastic a t the price $4.00, well below the equilibrium price $10.75. The tentative hypothesis was that the large rent ($6.75) enjoyed by the marginal seller, with still larger rents for the intramarginal sellers, might prevent the theoretical equilibrium from being established. From the results it is seen that the earlier conjecture concerning the efiect of a divergence between buyer and seller rent on the approach to equilibrium is confirmed. The approach to ecluilibrium is from below, and the convergence is relatively slow. However, there is no indication that the lack of marginal sellers near the theoretical equilibrium has prevented the equilibrium from being attained. The average contract price in trading period 4 is $10.90, only $0.15 above the predicted equilibrium.
,4t the close of trading period 4 in test 611, thc old buyer cards corresponding to DD were rcplaced by new cards correspoilding to U'L)' in Chart 6. Trading was resumed with the new conditions of decreased demand (test 6B). There was not sufficient time to permit two full trading periods of market experience to be obtained under the new demand conditions. However, from the results i11 Chart 6, it is evident that the market responded promptly to the decrease in (test 8 A ) , only sellers were permittecl to enunciate offers. In this market, buyers played a passive role; they could either accept or reject the offers of sellers but were not permitted to make bids. This market was intended to simulate spproximately an ordinary retail market. I n such markets, in the United States, sellers typically take the initiative in CHART 8 demand by showing apparent convergence to the new equilibrium. Note in particular that there occurred no significant tendency for market prices to overshoot the new equilibrium as was observed in test 5B.
All of the above experiments were conducted under the same general rules of market organization. Test 8 was performed as an exploratory means of testing the effect of changes in market organization on market price. In the first four trading periods of this experiment advertising their offer prices, with buyers electing to buy or not to buy rather than taking part in a higgling and bargaining process. Since sellers desire to sell a t the highest prices they can get, one would expect the offer prices to be high, and, consequently, one might expect the exchange prices to show a persistent tendency to remain above the predicted equilibrium. The result was in accordance with this crude expectation in the first market period only (test 8A, Chart 8). Since sellers only were making offers, the price quotations tended to be very much above equilibrium. Five of these offers mere accepted a t prices ranging from $2.69 to $2.80 by the five buyers with maximum reservation prices of $2.73 or more. This left only buyers with lower reservation prices. The competition of sellers pushed the offer prices lower and the remaining buyers made contracts a t prices ($2.35, $2.00, and $2.00) near or below the equilibrium price. The early buyers in that first market period never quite recovered from having subsequently seen exchange prices fall much below the prices a t which they had bought. Having been badly fleeced, through ignorance, in that first trading period, they refrained from accepting any high price offers in the remaining three periods of the test. This action, together with seller offer price competition, kept exchange prices a t levels persistently below equilibrium for the remainder of test 8A. Furthermore, the coefficient of convergence increased from 2.9 per cent in the second trading period to 7.4 and 7.0 per cent in the last two periods. At the close of the fourth trading period, the market rules were changed to allow buyers to make quotations as well as sellers. Under the new rules (test 8B) two trading periods were run. Exchange prices immediately moved toward equilibrium with the closing prices of period 1 and opening prices of period 2 being above the equilibrium for the first time since period 1 of test 8A.
I t would seem to be of some significance that of the ten experiments reported on, test 8 shows the clearest lack of convergence toward equilibrium. More -experiments are necessary to confirm or deny these but it appear that important changes in market organization-such as permitting only sellers make quotations-have a distinctly disturbing effcct on the equilibrating process. I n particular the conclusion is suggested that markets in which only sellers competitively publicize their offers tend to operate to the benefit of buyers a t the expense of sellers.
Turning to tests 9A and 10 (shown in Charts 9 and lo), it should be noted that the buyers and sellers in these tests received the same cards as their counterparts in test 7. The only difference was that the former entered the market to effect two transactions each, instead of one. Thus the three buyers with $3.70 cards could each buy two units a t $3.70 or less in tests 9 and 10. This change in the design of test 7 resulted in a doubling of the maximum demand and supply quantities a t each hypothetical price.
By permitting each buyer and seller to make two contracts per period, twice as much market "experience" is potentially to be gained by each trader in a given period. Each trader can experiment more in a given market-correcting his bids or offers in the light of any surprises or disappointments resulting from his first contract. I n the previous experiments such corrections or alterations in the bargaining behavior of a trader had to await the next trading period once the trader had made a contract."
Comparison of the results of the three trading periods in test 9A with the first three trading periods of test 7 shows that the tendencies toward equilibrium (as measured by a ) were greater in test 9A during the first two periods and smaller in the third period. The same comparison between tests 7 and 10 reveals a stronger tendency toward equilibrium in test 10 than in the first three periods of trade increased to the new equilibrium rate of twenty units per period. Note that the equilibrium tendency in the trading period of test 9B was greater than in any of the perious periods of test 9A. The increase in demand, far from destabilizing the market as was the case in test 5B, tended to strengthen its relatively weak ecluilibrium tendencies.
CHART 9 of 7. TTence a n increase in vclume appears to sl'eetl the equilibrating process. Intleed, the three trading periods of test 10 are roughly equivalent to the six trading periods of test 7, so that doubling s-olume in a given period is comparable to running two trading periods a t the same volume.
I n test 9B the consequences of an increase in demand were once again tested. Contract prices responded by moving upward immediately, and the volume
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF EXPERI-MENTAL DATA: THE "EXCESS-RENT" HYPOTHESIS
The empirical analysis of these ten experiments rests upon the hypothesis that there exists a stochastic difference equation which "best" represents the price convergence tendencies apparent in Charts 1-10. The general hypothesis is that 
My first empirical investigation is concerned with the measuremet of the equilibrating tendencies in these markets and the ability of supply and demand theory to predict the equilibrium price in each experiment. To this end note that equation (1) defines a stochastic phase function12 of the form pt+l = g(pr) + el. An equilibrium price Po is attained when P, = g(Po Hovever, since in all of the basic experiments there are twenty or more observations, the bias ~vill not tend to be large.
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--intervals for a 95 per cent fiducial probability level are shown in parentheses under the estimate of al for each experiment. With the exception of experiment SA, the 95 per cent confidence interval for each regression coefficient is entirely contained in the interval -2 < a1 < 0, which is recluired for market stability. Hence, of these ten experin~ents, SA is the only one whose price movements are sufliciently erratic to prevent us from rejecting the null hypothesis of instability, and of the ten basic experiments this
. Y ( a u + a l I ' u )
for the sample estimates on the assumption that Apt = 0 when p t = Po in the population. These t-values are shown in column 1, Table 3 , for the ten primary and the five "B" auxilary experiments.
Low absolute values of t imply that, relative to the error in the prediction, the predicted equilibrium is close to the theoretical. The four lowest absolute tvalues are for experimental designs with the smallest difference between equilibri- I is the one in which the trading rules were altered to permit only sellers to quote prices.14 The regressions of column 1, Table  2 , and associated computation provide a means of predicting the adjustment pressure on price, Apt, for any given pL.I n particular, we can compute ' T h~. e e of the five auxiliary "B" experiments demonstratccl a similar instability (in the iiducial probabilii?-sense), but the samples were considera l~l y sn~aller than their ",4" counterparts, they I-eprese~ited consitlerahly fewer trading periods, and they hat1 tliricrent ant1 val-ying objectives. Thc unstable ones \\.el-e 4 B , 8B, and 9B. um buyers' and sellers' rent. These results provide some additional evidence in favor of our conjecture in Part 111, that the equilibrium is influenced by the relative sizes of the areas A and B. However, from the t-values it would seem that the influence is small except for test 4, where B = 0. In this case, the null hypothesis (Apt = 0 when pt = PO) is rejected even a t a significance level below .005.
Four specific forms for the difference ecluation (1) were studied in detail and tested for their ability to predict the theoretical cc~uilil~rium 1)rice. rl'l~ese will be referred to as the Walrasian, the escess-rent, the modified Walrasian, and the modified excess-rent hypotheses, respectively. The \4'alrasian hypothesis is Apt = Pol + Pllxlt, where xlt is the excess deinand prevailing a t the price, p,, a t which the fth transaction occurred. Because of the conjecture that buyers' and sellers' rent might have an effect on iildividual and marliet adjustment, an excess-rent hypothesis was introduced. This hypothesis is Apt = jS02 + $22n.21,vlicremet is the alqcl~raic area 1)et~veen the supply and demand curves, and extends from the eiluilihrium price down to the price of the tth transaction, as sho~vn in Figure 1 . The modified \Val-rasian hypothesis is Apt = Poa + P13xLt + Pasxat, where m a t = A ) -By, the algebraic difference l~e t~v e e !~ the ecluilibrium buyers' rent, A:, ant1 the ecluilibriurn sellers' rent, Bf. The motivation here was to introduce a term in the adjustment equation which would permit the actual equilibriunl price to be biased above or below the theoretical equilibrium, by an amount proportional to the algebraic difference bctivccn buycrs' ;lnd sellers' rent a t the tlieoretical ccluilil~li-urn. I t was believed that such a general hypothesis might be necessary to account for the obvious price equilibrium bias in experiment 4 and the slight apparent bias in experiments 3, 611, 7, and 9A.
-1similar motivation suggested the modified excess-rent hypothesis, Ap, = po4+ P ? 4 2 2 1 +P34~3t.
Since the trading process in these e lperiments was such that transactions might and generally did take place a t non-equilibrium prices, the supply and demand curves shift after each transaction. Hence, in generating observation5 on xlt, xzt, and xal, the supply and deilland curves were adjusted after each transaction for the effect of the pairing of a buyer and a seller in reducing their el'fective demand and supply. Thus, in Chart 7, the first transaction was a t S0.50 between the seller with reservation 1)rice $0.20 and a buyer with reservation rice $.Z.50. 1:ollo~ving this trasaction the new effective demand and supply curves I~ecoineDd and ss as shown. The next transaction is a t $1.50. Our hypothesis is that the increase in price from $0.50 to $1.50 is due to the conditions represented by Dd and ss a t the price $0.50. Thus, for the first set of observations Apl = $1 -Po = $1.50 -$0.50 = $1.00, xll = 11, xzl= 20.10, and XBI = -9.60 as can be determined from Chart 7. 'l'hc second transaction paired a $\Z.'iO buycr and a $0.60 seller. The next set of obse~ -vations is then obtained by removing this buyer and seller from Dd and ss to obtain x12, x2?, and x3? a t $2 = 1.50, with ApL= p2-pl = 0, and so on.
Using observations obtained in this manner, regressions for the four different equilibrating hypotheses were computetl for the ten fundamental experiments as shown in Table 2 , columns 2-5. 1 95 pcr cent co~ifidence interval is sllui~ 11 ill l~trcntheses under each regression coeffi-ing thereby to support the excess-rent cient. With the exception of experiment hypothesis. -\ inore exact discrimin, 1011 t'
' 1 811, the regression coefficients for every experiment are sigrlificant under both the Ia'alrasian and the excess-rent hypotheses. On the other hand, /333 in the modified 17\'alrasian hypothesis is significant only in experiment 2. In none of the experiments is Paqsignificant for the modified excess-rent hypothesis. These highly unambiguous results seem to suggest that little significance can be attached to the effect of a difference between equilibrium buyers' and sellers' rent in biasing the price equilibrium tendencies.
On this reasoning, we are left with the closely competing M'alrasian and excess-rcnt hypotheses, showing highly significant adjustment speeds, and 022. In cliscriminating between these two hypotheses we shall compare them on two important counts: (1) their ability to predict zero price change in equilibrium, and (2) the standard errors of said predictions. Since x:, = x:, = 0, in equilibrium, this requires a comparison between the absolute values of the intercepts of the Walrasian and the excess-rent regressions, / pol / and / P o 2 / , and between S(Po,) and S(PU2). Under the first comparison we can think of 1 Pol1 , shown in column 2, Table 3 , as a "score" for the IValrasian hypothesis, and / Po21 , shown in column 5, as a "score" for the excessrelit hypothesis. -\ low intercept represents a good score. Thus, for experiment 1, in ecluilibriuin, there is a residual tendency for price to change (in this case fall) a t the rate of 2.6 cents per transaction by the Walrasian and 2.8 cents by the excess-rent regressions. -\ casual comparison of columns 2 and 5 reveals that in most of the experiments I Pol1 > 1 Po?) ,and in those for which the reverse is true the diifererlcc is cluite small, tendcan be lllade by applying the Wilcoxon" paired-sample rank test for related Samples to the "scores" of columns 2 and 5. This test applies to the difierences I pol 1 -I Po?1, and tests the null hypothesis, IIo, that the UTalrasian and excessrent alternatives are equivalent (the tlistrihution of the differences is symmetric about zero). If applied to all the experiments, including the "B's" (-V = 15), II, is rejected a t the < .02 significance level. The difference between our paired series of "scores" in favor of the er~cess-rent hypothesis is therefore signiiicant. It is highly debatable whether all the experiments should he included in such a test, especially 4, which did not tend to the predicted equilibriun~, 8, which represented a different organization of the bargaining, and possibly the "B" experiments, where the samples were smail. Therefore, the test was run omitting all these experiments (Y = 8), giving a rejection of Iloa t the .05 la-el. Omitting only 4 and 8 (LV= 11) allowed 1 1 "still to he rejected a t the < .02 level.
If we compare the standard errors S(Po1) and S(P02) in Table 3 , colui~lns 3 and 6, we see that again the excess-rent hypothesis tends to score higher (smaller standard errors). Applying the Wilcoxoll test to S(Pol) -S(Po2) for all the experiments (AV= 151, we find that this clifference, in favor of the excess-rent hypothcsis, is significant a t the <.O1 level. The difference is still significant a t the <.O1 level if we omit 4 and 8 from the test, and it is significant a t the .05 level if we also eliminate all the "B" esperiments.
The t-values for the two hypotheses Table   3 . They tend also to be lower for the excess-rent hypothesis.
Bearing in mind that our analysis is based upon a limited number of experiments, and that revisions may be required in the light of further experiments with different subjects or with monetary payoffs, we conclude the following: Of the four hypotheses tested, the two modified forms show highly insignificant regression coefficients for the added explanatory variable. As between the Walrasian and the excess-rent hypotheses, the evidence is sharply in favor of the latter.
V. 1<,1TIONALIZ.4TION O F THE EXCESS-RENT HYPOTHESIS
Having provided a tentative empirical verification of the hypothesis that price in a competitve (auction) market tends to rise or fall in proportion to the excess buyer plus seller rent corresponding to any contract price, it remains to provide some theoretical rationale for such a hypothesis. From the description of the above experiments and their results, the excess-rent hypothesis would seem to have some plausibility from an individual decision-making point of view. Given that a particular contract price has just been executed, it is reasonable to expect each trader to compare that price with his own reservation price, the difference being a "profit" or rent which he considers achievable, and to present a degree oi bargaining resistance in the auction process which is greater, the smaller is this rent. Such resistance may tend to give way, even where the rents on one side or the otlier are very small, ii it becomes clear that such rents are unattainable. Thus, if equilibrium buyers' rent er\ccetls sellers' rcnt, any curly tendency lor contract prices to reiliain a b o~e eiluilibrium (and balance the rents achieved on both sides) might be expected to break down, as it becomes evident that the "paper" rents a t those prices may not be attainable by all of the sellers. By this argument, it is suggested that the propensity of sellers to reduce their offers when price is above equilibrium is related to their attempts to obtain some-even if a "smallH-amount of rent rather than to a direct influence of excess supply.
A particularly interesting aspect of the excess-rent hypothesis is that it leads naturally to an interesting optimality interpretation of the static competitive market equilibrium. The principle is this: in static equilibrium a competitive market minimizes the total virtual rent received by buyers and sellers. By "virtual rent" I mean the rent that would be enjoyed if all buyers and sellers could be satisfied a t any given disequilibrium price. To see this optimality principle, let D(p) be the demand function and S(p) the supply function. At p = P, the sum of buyer and seller virtual rent is and is represented by the area from in Figure 1 . R is a minimum for normal supply and demand functions when that is, when demand equals supply with P = PO.Note particularly that there is nothing artificial about this conversion of the statement of an ordinary competitive market equilibrium into a corresponding minimum problem. Whether one desires to attach any welfare significance to the concepts of consumer and producer surplus or not, it is corn- pletely plausible to require, in the interests of strict market efficiency, that no trader be imputed more rent than is absolutely necessary to perform the exchange mechanics. Hence, a t price P in Figure 1 ,virtual rent exceeds equilibrium rent, and if this price persists, some sellers get more rent than they "should."
I t should perhaps be pointed out that the excess-rent and Walrasian hypotheses are close analogues in that both deal with virtual, unattainable quantities. Thus, under the Walrasian hypothesis the "virtual" excess supply a t P in Figure 1 is unattainable. Indeed, it is this fact that presumably causes price to fall. Similarly, a t P, the excess rent area above S and D is unattainable, and leads to price cutting. Also note that the Walrasian hypothesis bears a gradient relationship, while the excessrent hypothesis shows a global adjusting relationship, to the rent minimization principle. At P > Po the Walrasian hypothesis says that price tends to fall a t a time rate which is proportional to the marginal rent, dR/dP, a t that price. The excess-rent hypothesis states that price tends to fall a t a time rate which is proportional to the global difference between total rent a t P and a t Po.
Samuelson has shown how one may convert the Cournot-Enke problem of spatial price equilibrium into a maximum problem. 16 The criterion to be maximized in a single market would be what he calls social payoff, defined as the algebraic area under the excess-demand curve. In spatially separated markets the criterion is to maximize net social payoff, defined as the sum of the social payoffs in all regions minus the total transport costs of all interregional ship-' ". ments. But, according to Samuelson, '(this magnitude is artificial in the sense that noVcomDetitor in the market will be aware of or concerned with it. I t is artificial in the sense that after an Invisible Hand has led us to its maximization, we need not necessarily attach any social welfare significance to the result."" I think the formulation of competitive market equilibrium as a rent minimization problem makes the "Invisible Hand" distinctly more visible and more t e l e~l o g i c a l .~~ has social It also great (though not necessarily welfare) significance in relation to 'Lfrictionless" market efficiency. Rent is an "unearned" increment which literally cries out for minimization in an efficient economic organization. Furthermore, as we have seen with the excess-rent and Walrasian hypotheses, both the abstract teleological goal of the competitive market and the dynamics of its-t&tonnement process are branches of the same market mechanism.
I n view of the electrical circuit analogue so often mentioned in connection with spatially separated markets, a final bonus of the minimum rent formulation is the fact that it represents a more direct analogy with the principle of minimum heat loss in electric circuits.lg Nature has devised a set of laws to govern the flow of electrical energy, which, it l7 Ibid., p. 288. l8 The discovery of the excess-rent hypothesis draws me nearer to the camp of "Invisible Hand" enthusiasts, but only because of the greater visibility of the Hand. I cannot quite carry my market metaphysics as far as does Samuelson. I t is well known that any problem in economic equilibrium can be converted into a maximum (or minimum) problem, but I question the value of such a transformation (beyond technical advantages) if it is purely artificial without any meaningful interpretation; and if we work at it, such a meaningful tmnsformation may often be found.
can be shown, minimizes the inefficient, wasteful loss of heat energy from electrical systems. Similarly, the market mechanism provides a set of "laws" which minimizes the "wasteful" payment of excessive economic rent.
VI. SUhlMAKY I t would be premature to assert any broad generalizations based upon the ten experiments we have discussed. Yet conclusions are important for purposes of specifying the exact character of any findings, whether those findings are ultimately verified or not. I n this spirit, the following tentative conclusions are offered concerning these experiments :
1. Even where numbers are "small," there are strong tendencies for a supply and demand competitive equilibrium to be attained as long as one is able to prohibit collusion and to maintain absolute publicity of all bids, offers, and transactions. Publicity of quotations and absence of collusion were major characteristics of these experimental markets.
2. Changes in the conditions of supply or demand cause changes in the volume of transactions per period and the general level of contract prices. These latter correspond reasonably well with the predictions of competitive price theory. The response to such changes may, however, produce a transient phase of very erratic contract price behavior.
3. Some slight evidence has been provided to suggest that a prediction of the static equilibrium of a competitive market requires knowledge of the shapes of the supply and demand schedules as well as the intersection of such schedules. The evidence is strongest in the extreme case in which the supply curve is perfectly elastic, with the result that the empirical equilibrium is higher than the theoretical equilibrium. 4. Markets whose institutional organization is such that only sellers make price quotations may exhibit weaker equilibrium tendencies than markets in which both buyers and sellers make price quotations-perhaps even disequilibrium tendencies. Such one-sided markets may operate to the benefit of buyers. A possible explanation is that in the price-formation process buyers reveal a minimum of information concerning their eagerness to buy.
5. The so-called Walrasian hypothesis concerning the mechanism of market adjustment seems not to be confirmed.
A more adequate hypothesis is the excess-rent hypothesis which relates the "speed" of contract price adjustment to the algebraic excess of buyer plus seller "virtual" rent over the equilibrium buyer plus seller rent. This new hypothesis becomes particularly intriguing in view of the fact that a competitive market for a single commodity can be interpreted as seeking to minimize total rent.
APPENDIX
In the course of this experimental study and its analysis several additional or peripheral issues were investigated, a discussion of which would not fit clearly into the main body of this report. Three such issues will be discussed briefly in this appendix for the benefit of readers interested in some of the numerous additional lines of inquiry that might be pursued.
I. EVIDENCE OF IKTER-TR.iDIKG-PERIOD LEARNIKG
In testing the various equilibrating hypotheses under investigation in this paper, no attempt was made to distinguish the effects of different trading periods. The sample of observations for each experiment embraced all the trading periods of that expuiment with transactions running continu-sioiis may be better equilibrating equations ously from the first trading period through (better predictors of zero price change when the last. I t would appear, however, that excess rent is zero) than the earlier period learning occurs as the experiment progresses regressions. in sucli a way as to alter the parameters of each equilibrating hypothesis from one 11. CONVERGENCE OF BID, OFFER, trading period to the next. T o obtain some A S D CONTRACT PRICES idea of the extent of these alterations, re-I n experiments 9 and 10 a tape-recorder gressions for the excess-rent hypothesis mere was used for the first time to obtain a record conlputed by individual trading period for of all bid and offer prices as well as the tests 6A, 9 d , and 10. These regression equa-contract prices. KO analysis has as yet been tions are summarized in Table 4 . I t is evi-attempted with these additional data. Howdent that there is a tendency for the inter-ever, a graph of the bid, offer, and contract cepts of these regressions to converge toward prices in their serial sequence of occurrence zero as the number of trading periods in-is suggestive. Such a sample graph is shown creases. Convergence of the intercepts sug-in Chart 11 for experiment 10. Perhaps gebtb that the later trading period regres-the most interesting fact revealed in this 
